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Abstract 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties to share secret keys with the proven 
security even in the presence of an eavesdropper with unbounded computational power. Recently, 
GHz-clock decoy QKD systems have been realized by employing ultrafast optical 
communication devices. However, security loopholes of high-speed systems have not been fully 
explored yet. Here we point out a security loophole at the transmitter of the GHz-clock QKD, 
which is a common problem in high-speed QKD systems using practical band-width limited 
devices. We experimentally observe the inter-pulse intensity correlation and modulation-pattern 
dependent intensity deviation in a practical high-speed QKD system. Such correlation violates 
the assumption of most security theories. We also provide its countermeasure which does not 
require significant changes of hardware and can generate keys secure over 100 km fiber 
transmission. Our countermeasure is simple, effective and applicable to wide range of high-
speed QKD systems, and thus paves the way to realize ultrafast and security-certified 
commercial QKD systems. 
 
Introduction  
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1-3] allows two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to establish 
symmetric keys with the proven security even in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who has 
unbounded computational power. Thanks to this unique feature, referred to as “information theoretic 
security”, QKD, combined with Vernam’s one-time pad cipher, enables the everlasting protection of 
confidentiality of data transmission, and hence must be an essential element to construct a long-term 
security system which cannot be realized only by cryptographic schemes based on computational 
security. Such a system has been exemplified in the literatures [4,5] as a long-term-secure storage 
network consisting of secret sharing, QKD and authentication schemes to deal with highly confidential 
data such as personal biomedical data, pharmaceutical, and genetic information. Because of growing 
interest in the confidentiality of those data, this storage network could be one of the killer applications 
of QKD. 
   Toward its practical realization, tremendous progress has been made during the past decades. 
Metropolitan QKD networks have been successfully deployed [6-10] and is going to be a continental 
scale [11]. To provide information-theoretically secure keys to real applications securely and 
seamlessly, an efficient key management system and application program interfaces has been 
developed [12]. For the QKD device itself, high speed and stable operation is critical. By employing 
the ultrafast optical communication devices, high-speed QKD systems stably operated at GHz-clock 
frequency is realized in the installed-fiber networks [13-15]. 
Nevertheless, there remains an obstacle that makes the potential users hesitate to adopt this 
emerging technology; they would not innovate their existing secure-communication systems unless 
convinced that a QKD system at hand is really secure. In practice, like other cryptographic systems, a 
QKD system also has potential vulnerability due to mismatches between practical implementation and 
the theoretical model used for security proofs, which are referred to as side channels. For the QKD 
technology to be widely adopted, critical requirements are security certification, test-and-measurement 
method, security criteria for implementation, and countermeasures against the side channels. Moreover, 
those should be acceptable for non-experts. So far, receiver’s security loopholes due to the side 
channels and countermeasures have been extensively studied for the existing QKD systems [16-19]. 
Also, the measurement device independent QKD protocol [20,21] can circumvent any receiver 
imperfections in principle. By contrast, researches on loopholes in transmitters have just begun in only 
a few aspects [22-26]. Loopholes in transmitters are directly linked to the mismatch of the state 
preparation between the ideal model and the implementation of QKD protocols. Therefore, rigorously 
quantitative evaluation of the imperfections in transmitters are essential to the security certification of 
QKD systems.  
In this paper, we report a new security loophole, which may commonly exist in the transmitters of 
high-speed QKD systems, but has been overlooked so far despite its seriousness and generality. The 
current decoy-BB84 QKD systems generally rely on the matured ultrafast optical communication 
technology for high-speed operation, especially on signal modulation devices [13-15]. As shown 
below, the loophole in fact hides in the intensity modulator (IM) of such systems. Since practical 
modulators and electrical drivers are band-limited (which is common in optical communication as 
well), electrical signal distortion causes intensity correlation between the optical pulses as well as 
intensity fluctuation of individual pulses, where the former is particularly critical for the security since 
current security analysis usually assumes independent and identically distributed (IID) pulses. Such 
an inter-pulse intensity correlation occurs inevitably, and would provide additional information to an 
eavesdropper (Eve) to distinguish decoy state pulses from signal pulses. In other words, the QKD 
system without the countermeasure against intensity correlation in optical pulse train can be no longer 
guaranteed secure, and such a defective QKD system may cause a disaster for secure communications.  
Against such a serious loophole, we develop its countermeasure which does not require new 
hardware. Although there are previous works [27-29] extending the coverage of the security proofs to 
accommodate the non-IID cases, a better performance of the QKD system will be achieved by 
developing more preemptive methods to circumvent correlations and fluctuations, based on the 
understanding on the real GHz-clocked QKD system [12] characteristics. We experimentally observe 
this modulation-pattern dependent intensity deviation and provide an efficient countermeasure. Our 
countermeasure consists of three post-processing operations: pattern sifting (PS), alternate key 
distillation (AKD), and intensity sifting (IS), which effectively recover the IID assumption and work 
for finite key length. Finally, we estimate the secure key rate and confirm achievability of the 
transmitter-loophole-closed secure key generation by high-speed decoy QKD system over 100km. 
 
Optical intensity deviation with inter-pulse correlation 
Figure 1 shows a conceptual view of our QKD transmitter working at 1.24-GHz clock rate. The 
first intensity modulator (IM) controls the intensity of the 50ps-width laser pulse for the three-state 
decoy protocol [30,31] and the following devices are for the time-bin BB84 signal encoding by an 
asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI), a modulator for encoding, and a variable optical 
attenuator (VOA) to attenuate the pulse energy to the single-photon level. The decoy IM is a dual-
electrode Lithium Niobate (LN) modulator of 10 GHz bandwidth, driven by an electrical circuit 
designed for 10 Gbps digital optical communication. Relative input timing of optical pulses and 
modulation signals to the IM is controlled by fiber length connected in front of the IM with the 
accuracy of 50 ps (corresponding to fiber length of 1 cm). 
The three-state decoy pulses are generated as follows. Two phase shift parameters 𝜑𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2) 
in the waveguides determine the output intensity as 𝐼𝑜𝑢𝑡 = cos
2[(𝜑1 − 𝜑2)/2 ] 𝐼𝑖𝑛: {𝜑1, 𝜑2} = {0,0}  
for “signal” (S), {𝜑1, 𝜑2} = {𝜋, 0} for “vacuum” (V), and {𝜑1, 𝜑2} = {𝜋, 𝜙} for “decoy” (D) states, 
where 𝜙 is determined by the designed decoy intensity. The phase shifts 𝜋 and 𝜙 are generated by 
electrical voltage pulses with the heights of Vand V, respectively. We assign voltages of Vfor “Hi” 
and 0 for “Lo” as the driving signals to one electrode (signal 1), whereas V for “Hi” and 0 for “Lo” 
as the one to the other electrode (signal 2), respectively. Using these assignments, S state can be 
generated by {signal 1, signal 2} = {Lo, Lo}, and V state by {Hi, Lo}, so that transmittance of the IM 
takes the maximum and minimum values at these applied voltages. On the other hand, D state can be 
produced by either {Lo, Hi} or {Hi, Hi}. In our case, {Hi, Hi} is used because required value of V is 
smaller than {Lo, Hi} for typical intensities where D state intensity is less than half of S state. 
Generally, an IM needs to be operated with mark rate of 50% to suppress the charge drift in the LN 
modulator during long-term operation. If the mark rates of modulation signals are biased, spontaneous 
polarization in the LN crystal is gradually enhanced, and it results in the waveform distortion of optical 
pulses. Our IM is operated with complementary mode, in which binary electrical signals Hi (Lo) in 
the first half of the pulse period is inverted to Lo (Hi) in the second half, automatically achieving 
mark rate of 50%. 
If the modulation worked perfectly for the randomly chosen S, D, and V states, the intensity of the 
optical pulses should be determined independently without fluctuation. However, in real high speed 
systems, the electrical waveform distortion and the timing jitter of the optical pulses will cause 
unwanted intensity change depending on the state of the preceded pulse, i.e., the intensity becomes 
correlated. We call this phenomenon as “pattern effect”. A simple explanation of the pattern effect is 
as follows; an ideal drive circuit with a flat frequency response provides rectangular waveforms to the 
IM. The pulse amplitudes are independent of the previous modulation signal, as shown by the 
waveforms in Fig. 1 (a). However, the frequency response of real drive circuits is not uniform; it may 
show resonant peaks, and reduction in high frequency signals. Such imperfect frequency response 
distorts the waveform as shown in Fig. 1 (b). The electrical signal amplitude may differ according to 
the previous modulation patterns. This phenomenon results in correlated intensity deviation of 
modulated optical pulses. 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual view of a transmitter (Alice) in typical decoy-BB84 QKD system using 
time-bin coding. LD: laser diode, IM: intensity modulator, AMZI: asymmetric Mach-Zehnder 
interferometer, PM: phase modulator, VOA: variable optical attenuator. 
(a) Ideal waveforms to the IM encoding signal (S) and decoy (D) state with complementary 
modulation. Pulse-shaped figures represent input timing of optical pulses. Pulse period (0.8 ns) is 
defined by the two solid lines. (b) Actual distorted waveforms from the 10-GHz bandwidth circuit. 
Optical pulses for decoy state with the preceding pulse D experience smaller phase shift than that 
with S. (c) conceptual image of operation points of intensity modulation. 
 
We measured the pattern effects by picking the optical pulses from the output of the IM. The optical 
pulses are measured by a high speed photo-receiver with 9.3 GHz-bandwidth and subsequently 
recorded in an oscilloscope with 8 GHz-bandwidth. We defined the pulse intensity as the area of the 
time profile of the measured signal in one period containing a pulse peak. This measurement can 
evaluate the energy of each optical pulse. We measured 100,000 pulses per single pulse pattern for 
statistical analysis. In this experiment, we evaluated the pulse intensity before strong attenuation by a 
VOA, assuming that the intensity fluctuation of the optical pulses linearly reflects the mean photon 
number fluctuation in the quantum pulses through heavy attenuation. 
In the following, we will show that measurements on only six pulse patterns among countless 
patterns of previous pulses are enough to characterize the pattern effect in our QKD equipment. The 
main cause of the pattern effect is the limited frequency response of the driving circuit, as explained 
before. The electric waveforms in Fig.1 (b) shows that modulation signals for the first pulses arrive at 
setting levels (0 or V(,) in 800 ps. It implies that the first half of the modulation signals has little 
effect on the second half. In other words, almost all the influence of pattern effect are limited to the 
adjacent pulses. Therefore we consider only the adjacent pulse states. Note that even if the 
complementary operation is used, pattern effects between adjacent pulses appear when the bandwidths 
of the devices are not enough because the voltage of the second half of previous modulation is different 
depending on its own signal (S, D or V). We ignore the intensity fluctuation of V state, since its effect 
on photon detection is smaller than that of stray light and dark counts. Then, we only need to measure 
the intensities of S pulses and D pulses with three types of predecessors: S, D, and V pulses. The six 
patterns are abbreviated to S→S, D→S, V→S, S→D, D→D, and V→D, where the intensities of the 
second pulses are to be measured. 
Table 1 lists the averaged pulse intensities for the six patterns. While pattern effects were small 
(0.6 %-2.1 %) on the S pulses, large deviation about 20 % was observed on the D pulses. The deviation 
exceeded the normalized standard deviation of the intensity fluctuation around 7-9%. 
The different behavior of the D pulses comes from the operating point of the decoy pulses. At this 
point, the output intensity is sensitive to the applied voltage fluctuation as depicted in Fig. 1 (c). In 
contrast, those of the vacuum and signal pulses are set to the extreme of the input-output characteristics 
of the modulator, so that the output intensities are insensitive to the applied voltage. 
One may consider the band-limitation of the measurement devices created “fake” pattern effects. 
If so, the pattern effect should have also appeared in S-state. However, observation showed that the 
pattern effect occurred only in D-state. Therefore, we concluded that the pattern effect originated from 
the intensity modulator.  
When such a correlated intensity deviation is apparent, IID property of the pulse sequence is not 
approved. Therefore, conventional security analyses can be no longer applied directly. This issue 
appears to varying degree as long as the operating point is set on the steep slope of the modulation 
curve, shown as point (D) in Fig. 1 (C). We propose a simple and effective solution in the next section. 
 
Table 1: Measured intensity of signal pulses and decoy pulses for three types of predecessors. 
S: signal pulse, D: decoy pulse, V: vacuum state. Deviation of the intensity is given by that from the 
reference patterns (S→S and S→D). 
 
pattern 
average intensity of 
second pulse (S) 
deviation 
from S→S 
normalized 
standard deviation 
S → S 1.000 +/- 0.032 (a.u) ----- 0.032 (?̃?𝑆) 
D → S 1.021 +/- 0.033 (a.u) + 2.1% 0.032 
V → S 1.006 +/- 0.034 (a.u) + 0.6% 0.034 
pattern 
average intensity of 
second pulse (D) 
deviation 
from S→D 
normalized 
standard deviation 
S → D 0.421 +/- 0.030 (a.u) ----- 0.070 (?̃?𝐷) 
D → D 0.344 +/- 0.031 (a.u) - 18.2% 0.090 
V → D 0.331 +/- 0.030 (a.u) - 21.4% 0.091 
 
Countermeasure to the pattern-effect loophole: pattern sifting and alternate key 
distillation 
Here we provide a software-based countermeasure against the pattern effects called “pattern sifting 
(PS)” and “alternate key distillation (AKD)”. We ignore the minor deviations observed in D->S and 
V->S, which are smaller than standard deviations, and assume that the intensity of an S pulse is 
independent of its predecessor. PS discards particular modulation patterns in the key distillation 
process. The sifting rule on a pulse should be independent of its nominal intensity S, D, or V. Otherwise 
sifting itself may offer information on the intensity to Eve. In other words, we should decide whether 
we discard the focused pulse using the knowledge of other pulses. As mentioned in the previous 
section, since we need to consider the correlation only between the adjacent pulses in our QKD 
transmitter using the complementary modulation, the sifting rule should depend on the state of the 
adjacent pulses. The effect of the predecessor pulse can be avoided by fixing its nominal pulse intensity. 
The most efficient choice is to discard the pulse whose predecessor pulse is in D or V states, while 
sifting out the ones preceded by S pulses. The correlation with successor pulse can be disregarded by 
discarding the pulse whose successor is in D state, because the D state intensity is affected by the 
focused pulse intensity. The rule is summarized as follows: 
(A) Discard the pulse, if its predecessor is in D or V state. 
(B) Discard the pulse, if its successor is in D state. 
Pulses are discarded depending on the state of predecessor and successor, not on the state of target 
pulse itself. Therefore, proportion of S, D and V is unchanged. As a result of the PS, the statistics of 
the sifted even-indexed pulses becomes IID conditionally on the variables for the odd-indexed pulses, 
and the same goes for the sifted odd-indexed pulses.  
After the PS process, we divide sifted keys into odd-indexed events and even-indexed events 
according to the emission time stamps, and execute key distillation for each bit sequence. We refer to 
this process as AKD. Although there are no correlations among the even-indexed pulses conditionally 
on the variables for the odd-indexed pulses, there still remains a possibility of correlations between 
the even-indexed pulses and the odd-indexed ones. This makes it rather nontrivial whether both of the 
odd and even keys from the AKD are simultaneously secure. We solved this issue by dividing known 
security proofs of a decoy-state BB84 protocol into two statements, one for estimation of photon 
number statistics through the use of decoy states and the other for security of a BB84 protocol with an 
imperfect source. We then found that each statement allows composition of the even and odd parts, 
namely, that a statement for the even-indexed part and one for the odd-indexed part together imply a 
similar statement for the whole, regardless of correlations. The detail is given in the Methods section. 
Figure 2 summarizes sifting rules in PS and pulse selection rules in AKD. Upper table regarding 
PS shows the probabilities for the pulse patterns using typical values of selection probabilities of signal, 
decoy, and vacuum states pS=14/16, pD=1/16, and pV=1/16. After PS, pS(1-pD) of the pulses will 
contribute to the key distillation, where the first factor comes from PS (A) and the second from PS (B). 
This fraction is 0.82 with the typical values, so that we can use most of the pulses for key distillation. 
 
  
Figure 2: Summary of sifting rules in “pattern sifting (PS)” and pulse selection rules in 
“alternate key distillation (AKD)”. The numbers after S, D, and V show the typical values of the 
selection probability. 
 
The pattern effect can also be avoided by following naive protocol. If Alice sends a pulse with a 
fixed intensity before the pulse used for key distillation, no pattern effects would be observed. For 
example, Alice always selects S-state for odd number pulses, then the intensity of even number pulses 
are immune from the pattern effects. However, in this protocol, Alice and Bob should discard the odd 
number pulse outcomes, because Eve may also know the intensity of the odd number pulses and 
improve her measurement for successful eavesdropping. Therefore, the final key rate in the naive 
protocol is decreased to half of the original protocol. 
Furthermore, one may think that faster devices can avoid the pattern effects. However, it is not 
clear how much bandwidth is needed for individual QKD systems, and it takes a very high cost, which 
is an obstruction against the widespread use of QKD systems. Our software-based PS and AKD enable 
to generate secure key using an existing QKD system without hardware replacements.  
 
Finite-length analysis with intensity sifting 
As long as the actual correlated pulse sequence is stationary, PS and AKD enable us to treat sifted key 
as if it was generated from an IID pulse sequence. Nevertheless, we have to consider the residual 
random intensity fluctuation, which would be brought by thermal noise or timing jitter of optical pulse 
and modulation electrical signals. Output power of the LD also would fluctuate. One way to establish 
a secure key in the presence of such a fluctuation is to apply “intensity sifting (IS)” to bound maximum 
and minimum of pulse intensities. In IS, we omit pulses whose intensities exceed the bound from key 
distillation process. This can be implemented with a pulse intensity monitor before attenuation by 
VOA in the transmitter and screening of the events for key distillation. 
We evaluated standard deviations in the second pulse and normalized them using the average 
intensities of S and D as shown in Table1. We referred standard deviations of the second pulse in the 
case of S→S and S→D patterns as 𝜎𝑆 and 𝜎𝐷, and normalized standard deviations as ?̃?𝑆 and ?̃?𝐷, 
respectively. The obtained values of ?̃?𝑆 and ?̃?𝐷 were 3.2% and 7.0%. The fluctuation of the decoy 
intensity ?̃?𝐷 was larger than that of the signal ?̃?𝑆, because of the steep slope of the modulation curve 
as depicted in Fig.1 (c). 
We extend a finite-key analysis [32] to consider the intensity fluctuations in signal, decoy and 
vacuum pulses. In Ref [32], authors provided concise finite-key security bounds which is based on the 
asymmetric decoy-state analysis proposed in Ref [30]. The IS procedure assures that the mean photon 
number of each pulse stays within the range [𝜇𝑎
𝐿 , 𝜇𝑎
𝑈] (𝑎 = S, D, V). We rederived the key length 
formula of Ref [32], which yields smallest final key rate by considering the range of the mean photon 
number. Details of the reformulation are described in Supplementary Information. 
Combination of PS, AKD and IS enables secure key generation even if the QKD equipment has 
correlated intensity deviation due to the pattern effect and random intensity distribution due to the 
thermal noise or timing jitter. We estimate the secure key rate of our GHz-clock QKD system. We 
assume that the intensity fluctuation obeys Gaussian distribution for S and D. We set the intensity 
range as [𝜇𝑎 − 𝑡𝜎𝑎 , 𝜇𝑎 + 𝑡𝜎𝑎] with a common factor t multiplied to standard deviation 𝜎𝑎 for a = S, 
D. We model the intensity fluctuation of the vacuum signal V by a half-Gaussian distribution 
𝑐 exp[−𝜇2/(2𝜎2)] (c is a normalization constant, and 𝜇 ≥ 0) and assume that its magnitude is 
similar to that of S, namely, 𝜎 = 𝜎𝑆. The intensity range in IS is set to [0, 𝑡𝜎]. Note that such Gaussian 
assumptions are not necessary in practice, since we can calibrate the probabilities of passing the IS 
and calculate effective probabilities pS, pD, and pV accordingly. 
We evaluate secure key rate with the three state decoy protocol with the nominal intensities μS=0.5, 
μD=0.2. We assume that Alice selects Y-basis (Z-basis) with the probability of PYa=0.25 (PZa=0.75), 
and Bob adopts passive basis choice by a fiber splitter to feed photon pulses to a single photon detector 
(InGaAs/InP APDs) with the Pxb for each basis (x=Y, Z). We set the probabilities to PYb=0.25 and 
PZb=0.75. The detector performances are assumed as follows: detection efficiency of ηdet=0.1, dark 
count probability Pdc of 10-6 and after pulse probability Pap of 10-2. Transmittance of the optical devices 
in Bob ηBob is assumed to be 0.25. We assume that the fiber of the quantum channel has an attenuation 
coefficient of 0.2dB/km, which refers to the transmittance of the quantum channel ηch=10-0.2L/10 with 
the fiber length of L (km). 
The error probability when Alice sends a pulse with the average photon number μa (a= S, D, V) in 
x-basis (x=Y, Z) is calculated with eax=Pdc+eopt[1-exp(-ημaPxb)]+PapDax/2, where eopt=0.01 is the error 
due to the imperfection of the optics, η is the total detection efficiency (η=ηchηBobηdet). Dax is the 
expected detection rate in x-basis detectors (excluding after-pulse effect) given as Dax=1-(1-2Pdc)exp(-
ημaPxb) for the pulse of the average photon number μa in x-basis. 
We set that our QKD is εsec-secret and εcor-correct. Here εsec-secret means that the secret key is 
distinguishable from the ideal key with probability at most of εsec, and εcor-correct means that the 
probability of Alice and Bob sharing identical secret key is no smaller than 1-εcor. In the key distillation 
process, we assume that the error correction cost is given by 𝜆𝐸𝐶 = 𝑓𝐸𝐶ℎ(𝑒𝑍) with 𝑓𝐸𝐶 = 1.2 and 
𝑒𝑍 = (𝐷𝑆𝑍 𝑒𝑆𝑍 + 𝐷𝐷𝑍 𝑒𝐷𝑍 + 𝐷𝑉𝑍 𝑒𝑉𝑍)/(𝐷𝑆𝑍 + 𝐷𝐷𝑍 + 𝐷𝑉𝑍) . We employ 𝜀𝑠𝑒𝑐 = 2 × 10
−11  and 
𝜀𝑐𝑜𝑟 = 2
−127 in the secure key rate simulation. 
The simulated secure key rate per pulse for several valid intensity ranges from 0.2𝜎𝑎 to 1.0𝜎𝑎 for 
100 Mbits sifted key as functions of transmission length are shown in Fig. 3. This figure implies that 
smaller valid range leads to longer distance. On the other hand, regarding key generation rate at short 
and middle distance less than 70 km, around 0.6𝜎𝑎 is optimal because of the trade-off between the 
amount of eliminated pulses by IS and the amount of discarded bits in the privacy amplification due 
to the effect of intensity distribution. Note that the optimal intensity range highly depends on the 
characteristics of the QKD system. Therefore, to maximize secure key rate, we need careful parameter 
selections according to the intensity fluctuation levels in the real system. 
 
Figure 3: Simulation of the final key rate for 100 Mbits sifted key considering intensity 
fluctuation caused by pattern effects and random noise. Valid intensity range of IS is changed 
from 0.2𝜎𝑎 to 1.0𝜎𝑎(a= S, D, V). 
 
Conclusion 
We have pointed out and experimentally evaluated intensity fluctuations of each optical pulse for 
1.24GHz-clocked high-speed QKD system for the first time. We found large intensity deviation of 
decoy pulse depending on previous modulation pattern due to distortion of electric signals originated 
from the limited bandwidth of the electronics. We newly developed countermeasures named “pattern 
sifting” and “alternate key distillation” against the correlated deviation, which aim at recovering the 
IID assumption common to the most of security proofs. We further showed that the remaining random 
intensity distribution due to thermal noise or timing jitter can be handled with “intensity sifting” 
method, which enables us to generate secure key with finite-length analysis using a real GHz-clock 
QKD system. The developed countermeasures yield reasonable key after 100-km transmission. Our 
results provide simple and effective solution to wide range of high-speed QKD systems, where the 
signal distortion is observed. 
 
Methods 
In Methods, we will prove security of the proposed decoy-state BB84 protocol under the pattern effect. 
The protocol uses the pattern sifting (PS) and the alternate key distillation (AKD). These two methods 
enable us to attune security proofs for standard decoy-state BB84 protocols to prove our case. To 
represent existing analyses of standard decoy-state BB84 protocols, we summarize notations as 
follows. 
 a : a sequence whose element { , , }ia S D V  represents the type (Signal, Decoy, or 
Vacuum, respectively) of the i -th pulse. 
 n : a sequence whose element {0,1, }in   represents the number of photons emitted in 
the i -th pulse. 
 ,A Bx x : sequences whose elements , ,, { , }A i B ix x Y Z  represent choices of the basis for 
the i -th pulse by Alice and Bob, respectively. 
 Ab : a sequence whose element , {0,1}A ib   represents Alice's bit value for the i -th pulse. 
 Λ : a sequence whose element i  represents the set of all the data associated with the i
-th pulse except ia  and in . It includes , ,,A i B ix x  and ,A ib  as well as Bob's 
measurement outcome. 
 { , , }S D V   : mean photon numbers corresponding to the types S , D  and V . 
 ( , ) : / !nq n e n  : the probability of n  photons emitted in a pulse with a mean 
photon number  . 
The assumptions used in existing analyses of standard decoy-state BB84 protocols are summarized 
as follows. 
1. The sequence a  is independent and identically distributed (IID) with prior probabilities 
S D,p p  and Vp . 
2. Each of the sequences Ax  and Bx  is IID with given probabilities. 
3. The sequence Ab  is IID with probability 1/ 2 . 
4. The probability distribution Pr( , )a n  is written as ( , )i i
i
f a n  with 
( , ) ( , )a af a n p q n  . 
5. Conditioned on , , Aa n x  and Ab , the state of the whole pulses is written as 
, ,( , , )i A i A i
i
n x b . 
6. The three sets of variables ,a n  and Λ  form a Markov chain, which we denote by 
 a n Λ . 
Assumption 6 is not an independent assumption but is a consequence of assumption 5 and the 
independence of a  from Ax  and Ab . We have included it for convenience of discussions below. 
By use of them, we represent existing security analyses of standard decoy-state BB84 protocols as 
a combination of two arguments (a) and (b). The argument (a) is a decoy-state analysis, which makes 
estimation over a photon number distribution. The decoy-state analysis is purely mathematical and the 
only assumptions it uses are 4 and 6. The result of estimation is usually given as a set of inequalities 
that are satisfied except with a small probability a . The inequalities imply, for example, a lower 
bound on the number of detections from single-photon ( 1n  ) signals. For our purpose, it is 
convenient to represent these inequalities equivalently by using a set   of admissible values 
( , , )a n Λ , namely, as ( , , )a n Λ . 
The argument (b) is a BB84 analysis with a known photon number distribution. It provides a rule 
( , )l a Λ  to determine the length l  of the final key from the data available in the protocol, and proves 
that it is secure if ( , , )a n Λ  holds. We emphasize here that this part of the argument does not 
rely on assumption 4 any longer since it only cares about the security in the case of ( , , )a n Λ . 
To describe the argument (b) more precisely, let us describe the real protocol as a diagram given in 
Fig. 4, in which the box “key substitution” should be ignored. We also introduce the ideal protocol, in 
which the actual key is substituted by an ideal key. The real protocol is called  -secure if it is 
distinguishable from the ideal protocol by at most  , measured in terms of trace distance. 
The argument (b) does not prove the security of the real protocol, but that of a variant which we 
call the intermediate protocol. In the intermediate protocol, the actual key is substituted by an ideal 
key if and only if ( , , )a n Λ  holds. The fact that the argument (b) does not rely on assumption 4 
implies that the security is not threatened even if a  and n  are determined by an adversary. Let us 
call the shaded region in Fig. 4 as the sub-protocol, which regards a  and n  as the data provided 
from outside. What is actually proved in the argument (b) is the security of the intermediate sub-
protocol, or its indistinguishability from the ideal sub-protocol. The statements of arguments (a) and 
(b) are summarized as follows. 
(a) For a positive real number a  and a set  , aPr(( , , ) ) . a n Λ  
(b) The intermediate sub-protocol with a set   and the final key length ( , )l a Λ  is b -secure 
for a positive real number b . 
 
 
Figure 4: A schematic representing a standard decoy-state BB84 protocol. Depending on real, 
intermediate, and ideal protocols, the rounded-corner box works differently as written in the right 
side of this figure. The shaded area represents the sub-protocol. 
 
Argument (b) guarantees that the intermediate sub-protocol is b -secure for any a  and n . 
Hence, the intermediate protocol, which uses the actual a  and n  as an input of the sub-protocol, is 
also b -secure. Since the difference between the real protocol and the intermediate protocol arises 
only if ( , , )a n Λ , assumption (a) implies that the trace distance is no larger than a . Using the 
triangle inequality for the trace distance, the real protocol is proved to be a b( )  -secure. 
Now, we consider a protocol under the pattern effect, which means the i -th type ia  affects 1in   
as well as in . We assume a model in which the mean photon number of the i -th pulse is represented 
as 1( , )i ia a   which satisfies 
 1 1( , ) , ( , ) , ( , )i S D i VS a D S V a          (1) 
for any 1ia  . The probability distribution of ( , )a n  is then written as 
 
1Pr( , ) ( , , ),i i i
i
f a a na n  (2) 
where 1 1( , , ) ( , ( , ))ii i i a i i if a a n p q n a a  . Although this change threatens assumption 4 in the 
standard case, we will show that the analyses in the standard case can be applied to the elements after 
PS and AKD, such as the even-indexed and pattern-sifted elements. To represent the restriction on the 
even-indexed elements, the odd-indexed elements and the pattern-sifted elements, we use the 
superscripts “even”, “odd” and “PS”, such as 
even odd,PS,a n  and so on. 
We define a set of even indices as 
evenI  and a set of indices of the even-indexed and pattern-
sifted elements as 
 
even,PS even
1 1: { , , { , }}.i iI i i I a S a S V    ∣  (3) 
It is then easy to see that 1( , , ) ( , )i i i i if a a n f a n   and 1 1 1 1( , , ) ( , )i i i i if a a n f a n     hold for 
even,PSi I . 
Although the pattern effect disturbs the form of Pr( , )a n  and prevents us from directly applying 
(a), we will show that the even-indexed and pattern-sifted elements satisfies assumptions 4 and 6 
conditionally on 
odd odd( , )a n , namely, the following two properties hold: 
(i) 
even ,PS
even,PS even,PS odd oddPr( , , ) ( , ).i i
i I
f a n

 a n a n∣  (4) 
(ii) 
even,PS even,PS odd odd even,PS( , , ) . a n n a Λ  (5) 
To show (i), we focus on the fact that the sequence of the pairs ( , )i ia n  forms a Markov chain 
1 1 2 2 3 3( , ) ( , ) ( , )a n a n a n    under the pattern effect. It means 
 
even even odd oddPr( , | , )a n a n
even
1 1 1 1Pr( , | , , , ).i i i i i i
i I
a n a n a n   

   (6) 
For 
even,PSi I , we find 
 1 1 1 1Pr( , | , , , )i i i i i ia n a n a n   
1 1 1
1 1 1
,
( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , )
i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
a n
f a a n f a a n
f a a n f a a n
  
  
 

  
 
 
1 1
1 1
,
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
i i
i i i i
i i i i
a n
f a n f a n
f a n f a n
 
 
 

 
 
 ( , ),i if a n  (7) 
and it means that the property (i) holds. 
To show (ii), we remind that the Markov property  a n Λ  holds even under the pattern 
effect. It means 
even even odd odd( , , ) a n n a Λ , and by restricting a  and Λ , we obtain 
even,PS even odd odd even,PS( , , ) . a n n a Λ  Eq. (6) means that the even-indexed pairs 2 2{( , )}j j ja n  
become independent from each other if we fix 
odd odd( , )a n . It leads to 
even,PS even,PS odd odd even,PS( , , ) a n n a n , where the superscript PS  means the elements removed 
by the pattern sifting. In general, two Markov properties 1 2X Y Y   and 1 2( , )X Y Y Z   
mean 1 2( , )X Y Z Y  , leading to 1X Y Z  . Setting 1 2( , , , )X Y Y Z  to be 
even,PS even,PS odd odd even,PS even,PS( ,( , ), , )a n n a n Λ , we obtain the condition (ii). 
Since both conditions (i) and (ii) required for (a) are satisfied in the even-indexed and pattern-
sifted elements, we can apply (a) to them and obtain 
 
even,PS even,PS even,PS odd odd
aPr(( , , ) , ) . a n Λ a n∣  (8) 
It also means 
 
even,PS even,PS even,PS
aPr(( , , ) ) . a n Λ  (9) 
because a  does not depend on 
odda  and 
oddn . The same goes for the odd-indexed and pattern-
sifted elements, and we can use the union bound to obtain 
 
even,PS even,PS even,PSPr(( , , )a n Λ
odd,PS odd,PS odd,PS
a( , , ) ) 2 .  a n Λ  (10) 
 
 
Figure 5: A schematic representation of a decoy-state BB84 protocol with PS and AKD. The 
protocol includes two sub-protocols defined in Fig. 4. Depending on real protocol, intermediate and 
ideal protocols, the sub-protocols change as in Fig. 4. 
 
Next, we consider the whole protocol with PS and AKD, which can be regarded as follows (see 
Fig. 5). The protocol generates a  and n , generates even,PS even,PS( , )a n  and odd,PS odd,PS( , )a n , and 
supplies them to two sub-protocols which are identical as the sub-protocol in Fig. 4. Each of the sub-
protocols produces a final key, and the concatenation of the two keys is the output of the protocol. We 
define the intermediate protocols and the ideal protocols as in the standard case. The argument (b) 
guarantees that each of the intermediate sub-protocols is b -secure. The standard argument of the 
universal composability means that the intermediate protocol is b2 -secure. Since the difference 
between the real protocol and the intermediate protocol is caused by the event where the condition 
 even,PS even,PS even,PS, , a n Λ  or  odd,PS odd,PS odd,PS, , a n Λ  is not satisfied, Eq. (10) bounds 
the trace distance to be no larger than a2 . As a consequence, we find that the real protocol is 
a b2( )  -secure. 
The above proof is also applicable when there exist independent fluctuations in the mean photon 
number after PS and AKD in our experiment. It can be done by extending a function ( , )f a n  to a 
set of functions satisfying a condition about intensity fluctuations. This change does not affect the 
above reasoning as long as the choice of set   in the argument (a) is dictated from a proof 
accommodating such fluctuations. 
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